We consider a formulation of a non zero-sum n players game by an n + 1 players zerosum game. We suppose the existence of the n + 1-th player in addition to n players in the main game, and virtual subsidies to the n players which is provided by the n + 1-th player. Its strategic variable affects only the subsidies, and does not affect choice of strategies by the n players in the main game. His objective function is the opposite of the sum of the payoffs of the n players. We will show 1) The minimax theorem by Sion (Sion(1958)) implies the existence of Nash equilibrium in the n players non zero-sum game.
Introduction
We consider a formulation of a non zero-sum n players game by an n + 1 players zero-sum game. We suppose the existence of the n +1-th player in addition to n players in the main game, and virtual subsidies to the n players which is provided by the n + 1-th player. Its strategic variable affects only the subsidies, and does not affect choice of strategies by the n players in the main game. His objective function is the opposite of the sum of the payoffs of the n players, then the game with n + 1 players, n players in the main game and the n + 1-th player, is a zero-sum game.
We will show the following results.
1. The minimax theorem by Sion (Sion (1958) ) implies the existence of Nash equilibrium in the n players non zero-sum game.
2. The maximin strategy of each player in {1, 2, . . . , n} with the minimax strategy of the n+1-th player is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium strategy of the n players non zero-sum game.
3. The existence of Nash equilibrium in the n players non zero-sum game implies Sion's minimax theorem for pairs of each of the n players and the n + 1-th player.
The model and the minimax theorem
There are n players Player 1, 2, . . . , n in a non zero-sum game. The strategic variable of Player i is denoted by x i . The common strategy space of the players is denoted by X, which is a compact set. There exists another player, Player n + 1. His strategic variable is f , We consider virtual subsidies to each player other than Player n + 1, ψ( f ), which is provided by Player n + 1 and is equal for any player. It is zero at the equilibrium. The payoff of Player i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n} is written as
The objective function of Player n + 1 is
The strategy space of Player n + 1 is denoted by F which is a compact set. Player n + 1 is not a dummy player because he can determine the value of its strategic variable. We assume
We postulate that this is unique. The game with Player 1, 2, . . . , n and Player n + 1 is a zero-sum game because
Sion's minimax theorem (Sion (1958) , Komiya (1988) , Kindler (2005) ) for a continuous function is stated as follows. We follow the description of this theorem in Kindler (2005) . Let x k 's for k i be given, then π i is a function of x i and f . We can apply Lemma 1 to such a situation, and get the following equation.
( 1) We assume that arg max
and so on are unique, that is, single-valued. We also assume that the best responses of players in any situation are unique.
The main results
Choice of f by Player n + 1 has an effect only on the fixed subsidy for each player. The optimal value of f for Player n + 1, which is equal to a, is determined independently of x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , and the optimal values of the strategic variables for Player 1, 2, . . . , n are determined independently of f . We have
for any value of f . Thus, arg max
First we show the following result.
Theorem 1.
Sion's minimax theorem (Lemma 1) implies the existence of Nash equilibrium in the non zero-sum main game.
2. The maximin strategy of each player in {1, 2, . . ., n} with the minimax strategy of Player n + 1 is equivalent to its Nash equilibrium strategy of the non zero-sum main game.
Proof. Let (x 1 ,x 2 , . . .,x n ) be the solution of the following equation.
Then, we have max
Since
i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n}.
Because the game is zero-sum,
Therefore, from (2) arg min
From (3), (4) and (5) we obtain
. .,x n , a), i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n} (5) and (6) mean that (x 1 , x 2 , . . ., x n , f ) = (x 1 ,x 2 , . . . ,x n , a) is a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game with n + 1 players. x 1 ,x 2 , . . . ,x n are determined independently of f . Thus,
Therefore, (x 1 ,x 2 , . . .,x n ) is a Nash equilibrium of the non zero-sum game with Player 1, 2, . . . , n.
Next we show
Theorem 2. The existence of Nash equilibrium in the n players non zero-sum game implies Sion's minimax theorem for pairs of Player i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and Player n + 1.
Proof. Let (x 1 ,x 2 , . . .,x n ) be a Nash equilibrium of the n players non zero-sum game. Consequently,
This is based on the fact that there exists a value of x i , x * i , such that given x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n other than x i ,
Thus,
. ., x n , f ) for any x i and any value of f , i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n},
On the other hand, since
we have max
This inequality holds for any f . Thus,
With (7), we obtain max
given x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n other than x i . (7) and (8) imply
and max
we have arg max
We also have max
and min
Therefore, we get arg min
arg max
An example
Consider a three firms oligopoly with differentiated goods. There are Firm 1, 2 and 3. Assume that the inverse demand functions are p 1 = a − x 1 − bx 2 − bx 3 , p 2 = a − bx 1 − x 2 − bx 3 , p 3 = a − bx 1 − bx 2 − x 3 , with 0 < b < 1. p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are the prices of the goods of Firm 1, 2, 3. x 1 , x 2 , x 3 are the outputs of the firms. The cost functions of the firms with the subsidies are
we obtain They are the same as the equilibrium outputs of the oligopoly with Firm 1, 2 and 3. In this paper we presented a zero-sum game formulation of a non zero-sum n players game considering the n + 1-th player and virtual subsidies to the players provided by the n + 1-th player.
